UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EUFEMIA ALAMO RAMIREZ,

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Plaintiff,

VS.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, Western Regional Office,

Defendants.

Civil No. 08-0976 WQH (CAB)

ORDER:

- (1) DENYING MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL [Doc. No. 3];
- (2) GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED *IN FORMA PAUPERIS* [Doc. No. 2]; and
- (3) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A

Eufemia Alamo Ramirez, a federal inmate currently incarcerated at the Metropolitan Correctional Center and proceeding pro se, has submitted a civil action pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). In Plaintiff's Complaint, he alleges that he suffered from a slip and fall due to the negligence of employees at the Metropolitan Correctional Center.

Plaintiff has not prepaid the \$350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed *In Forma Pauperis* ("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2], as well as a Motion for Appointment of Counsel pursuant to 28.U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) [Doc. No. 3].

I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS [Doc. No. 2]

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of \$350. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff's failure to prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). *See Rodriguez v. Cook*, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, prisoners granted leave to proceed IFP remain obligated to pay the entire fee in installments, regardless of whether their action is ultimately dismissed. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); *Taylor v. Delatoore*, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), further requires that each prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP submit a "certified copy of [his] trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) ... for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Using these certified trust account statements, the Court must assess an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposit, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, and collect that amount as the prisoner's initial partial filing fee, unless he has no current assets with which to pay. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4); *Taylor*, 281 F.3d at 850. Thereafter, the institution having custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month's income, in any month in which his account exceeds \$10, and forward those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); *Taylor*, 281 F.3d at 847.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit that complies with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) [Doc. No. 2] as well as a certified copy of his prison trust account statement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and Civil Local Rule 3.2. Plaintiff's trust account currently indicates that he has insufficient funds from which to pay an initial partial filing fee.

Accordingly, the Court hereby **GRANTS** Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 2], and assesses no initial partial filing fee at this time. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (court shall assess initial partial filing fee only "when funds exist"); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) ("In no event

shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action . . . for the reason that the prisoner has

no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee."); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850

(finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a "safety-valve" preventing dismissal of a prisoner's

IFP case based solely on a "failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when

payment is ordered."). However, Plaintiff is required to pay the full \$350 filing fee mandated

by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a) and 1915(b)(1), by subjecting any future funds credited to his prison

trust account to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

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II. MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL [DOC. No. 3]

Plaintiff also requests the appointment of counsel to assist him in prosecuting this civil action. The Constitution provides no right to appointment of counsel in a civil case, however, unless an indigent litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation. Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). Nonetheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), district courts are granted discretion to appoint counsel for indigent persons. This discretion may be exercised only under "exceptional circumstances." Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991). "A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation of both the 'likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.' Neither of these issues is dispositive and both must be viewed together before reaching a decision." *Id.* (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)).

The Court denies Plaintiff's request without prejudice, as neither the interests of justice nor exceptional circumstances warrant appointment of counsel at this time. LaMere v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017.

III. SUA SPONTE SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A

The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are "incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program," "as soon as practicable after docketing." See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these
provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any IFP or prisoner complaint, or any portion thereof, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or which seeks damages from defendants who are immune. *See* 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; *Lopez v. Smith*, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); *Resnick v. Hayes*, 213 F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A).

Before amendment by the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. *Lopez*, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. An action is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). However 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A now mandate that the court reviewing an IFP or prisoner's suit make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before effecting service of the Complaint by the U.S. Marshal pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). *Id.* at 1127 ("[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim."); *see also Barren v. Harrington*, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A).

While Plaintiff brings this Complaint pursuant to the Federal Torts Claim Act ("FTCA"), he fails to name the United States as a Defendant in this action. Thus, Plaintiff's FTCA claims against the individual defendants fail because the United States is the only proper defendant for an FTCA claim against a federal employee for actions taken within the scope of their employment. *See Ward v. Gordon*, 999 F.2d 1399, 1401 (9th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed but he will be permitted leave to file an Amended Complaint.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing therefor, **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that:

- 1. Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2] is **GRANTED**.
- 2. The Warden of the Metropolitan Correctional Center, or his designee, shall collect from Plaintiff's prison trust account the \$350 balance of the filing fee owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month's income and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the

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amount in the account exceeds \$10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Warden, Metropolitan Correctional Center, 808 Union Street, San Diego, California 92101.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

- 4. Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel [Doc. No. 3] is **DENIED** without prejudice; and
- 5. Plaintiff's Complaint is **DISMISSED** without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is **GRANTED** forty five (45) days leave from the date this Order is filed in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, if Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter be counted as a "strike" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 19, 2008

United States District Judge